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Introduction 
 
“The New Multi-HAzard and MulTi-RIsK Assessment MethodS for Europe” or MATRIX 
project is by definition a multi-disciplinary program, whose results and outcomes, again by 
default, cross many boundaries in terms of their relevance.  Natural disasters by their very 
nature show no regard for national, social or economic borders, and therefore efforts to 
mitigate against their negative consequences need to include the ability to communicate the 
findings of projects such as MATRIX to the broadest possible cross-section of the 
community. This not only includes other research scientists and engineers, but also civil 
protection authorities, decision and policy makers, as well as the general public. 
 
It is for this reason that this deliverable, D8.4 “MATRIX results I and reference report”, has 
been produced. In it are relatively short, but specific descriptions of some of the outcomes of 
the MATRIX project, presented in a manner that would appeal to a wide audience.  While 
these reports generally follow the themes pursued in the work packages into which MATRIX 
was organized, some effort has been expended in showing how the results from the different 
work packages relate to each other. 
 
The first report by Parolai et al. details the importance of harmonizing single-type risk 
assessments, in terms of presenting the risk arising from different hazards in a consistent 
and comparable form. This is followed by Garcia-Aristizabal et al., who outline the various 
cascading scenarios that have been identified for the MATRIX test cases. Desramaut et al. 
next present their assessment of the temporal variations of vulnerability from a systems point 
of view for the case of Guadeloupe, French West Indies, one of the MATRIX test sites.  A 
multi-level multi-risk framework developed within MATRIX is then described by Nadim et al. 
The MATRIX-CITY tool and Virtual City concept developed within the project is summarized 
by Mignan, while Komendantova et al. provide an outline of their results dealing with the 
multi-risk assessment tools and the response of end-users. A preliminary application of the 
framework developed by Nadim et al. to the MATRIX test cases is outlined by Fleming et al., 
with this document concluding with a discussion of the issue of multi-risk and governance 
provided by Scolobig et al. 
 
We believe the variety of reports presented in this document, while by no means exhausting 
the outcomes of the MATRIX project, nonetheless provides a sound overview of the project’s 
achievements, allowing the reader (be they researchers, practitioners, or the public) to gain 
some understanding of the challenges involved in, and need for, a multi-risk approach. The 
MATRIX consortium is under no delusion that much work is still required, but we are 
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confident that a multi-hazard and risk approach will be of fundamental value to future efforts 
in disaster risk reduction, especially within the context of the post-Hyogo Framework for 
Action era. 
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Comparing and harmonizing single-type risks. 
 
Stefano Parolai(1), Kevin Fleming(1), Alexander Garcia-Aristizabal(2) and Sergey 
Tyagunov(1). 
 
(1) Centre for Early Warning, Helmholtz-Centre Potsdam German Research Centre for Geosciences, 
Potsdam, Germany. 
(2) Analisi e Monitoraggio del Rischio Ambientale - Scarl, Naples, Italy. 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the MATRIX project has as its primary concern the interactions between hazards 
and their associated risks, and how this impacts upon all manner of potential losses, this by 
no means is meant to replace the assessment of single-type risks.  In fact, the project has 
been at pains to point this out, even while endeavouring to convince various members of the 
disaster risk reduction community of the necessity for a multi-type approach.  For example, 
following an expert meeting conducted by the European Commission Directorate-General 
Humanitarian and Civil Protection (ECHO) on risk assessment and mapping for disaster 
management (Brussels, July 2011) where MATRIX was represented, while the project 
presentation was well received,  one participant commented “I would be happy if I could 
manage a simple risk assessment. Multi-risk is far away from the reality on the ground.” 
 
Hence, considerable efforts within MATRIX were spent in better understanding the means by 
which different hazards and risks can be presented in a harmonized and comparable 
manner, including how individual risks can be combined, and how the associated 
uncertainties should be presented. Such ability is essential in that it allows a means of 
comparing the relative importance of different hazards and risks in order to assist decision 
makers in their prioritizing of mitigation activities. 
 
Risk metrics and scale factors 
 
The first question is therefore what should be employed as the most appropriate risk metric 
(a matter of “comparing apples with apples”), which would allow the losses from different 
types of disaster to be meaningfully compared. For example, considering Germany, although 
the summer 2003 heat wave resulted in the highest number of deaths from an extreme 
natural event for the period 1980-2010 (9,355 people), the associated economic losses were 
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relatively low (1.65 billion Euros) compared to the floods of 2002 (11.6 billion Euros) which 
caused the deaths of 27 people1. 
 
Another problem concerns the spatial and/or temporal scales being dealt with, each of which 
is, naturally, a function of the hazard in question. Considering spatial scales, different 
hazards have their own spatial pattern, for example, direct losses from floods are only of a 
concern to lower-lying areas close to water bodies, and so a flood may be rather localised.  
By contrast, a major earthquake will affect a much wider area, although again, depending 
upon geological conditions, there may be considerable spatial variability in the resulting 
ground shaking (e.g., Parolai et al., 2007). 
 
Similarly for temporal scales, some hazards display a more obvious degree of regularity, 
such as seasonal winter storms or hurricanes, while others must be considered over much 
longer time periods, for example, earthquakes and volcanos.  The problem, however, is that 
historical records may not be adequate to gain a proper understanding of what is to be 
expected over a given time period, let alone potential extreme events.  This may lead to the 
problem where more familiar events (e.g., hurricanes) are seriously considered, while rarer 
ones (e.g., earthquakes) are neglected, as was the case of older buildings in Kobe, Japan, 
whose heavy roofs were suitable for seasonal typhoons, but not for rare earthquakes (Otani, 
1999). 
 
It was therefore decided within the MATRIX project to generally concentrate on direct losses 
arising from direct damage to residential buildings over annual time scales and urban spatial 
scales.  The estimated losses or risk curves will then (usually) be expressed in the form of 
expected loss per annum (in Euros) versus probability. However, alternate means of 
presenting risk will be mentioned below. 
 
Combining and comparing risks 
 
In the following we call upon the example of Cologne, Germany (see MATRIX deliverables 
D2.3, Parolai et al., 2014, and D7.5, Fleming et al., 2014) to show how the risk arising from 
different hazards can be combined and compared. Considering first the risk curves derived 
for Cologne by Grünthal et al. (2006), who did not take into account potential interactions, we 
can obtain some idea of what the total risk may be due to several different hazards by 
employing the following simple formulation: 
 
                                               
1
 http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=66 
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            Ptot  =  1 - ∏ (1 – Pi)           (1) 
 
where Ptot is the total annual probability of exceedance of a given risk (expressed as Euros), 
and Pi is the probability of exceedance of a given risk i (i.e., here represented by 
earthquakes, landslides and floods).  The original three curves of Grünthal et al. (2006), 
along with the various combinations, are presented in Figure 1 (note, because of limitations 
in the original results, we cannot combine these risks for the entire range of losses covered). 
 
 
Figure 1:  The individual risk curves for the three main hazards (earthquakes – EQ, floods – FL, 
windstorms – WS) that affect Cologne and their various combinations derived using equation 1. 
 
We note that for the loss range over which all hazards have results, the resulting combination 
of the three curves differs little from combining only flood and windstorm (the dominate risks 
for higher probability/lower loss events).  However, if we were to consider, for example, all 
risk-types where losses are of the order of 100 million Euros, we see that the combination of 
curves will significantly increase the probability of such a level of loss, from 15 to 35% in 50 
years for the individual hazards, to around 75% in 50 years when combined. 
 
Another way in which such changes in risk may be presented is by a risk matrix2. In fact, as 
commented upon in Komendantova et al., (2014), end-users tend to prefer such a format as 
                                               
2
 This matrix follows approximately that employed by the German Federal Office of Civil Protection 
and Disaster Assistance (BBK, http://www.bbk.bund.de/). See also “Risk Mapping and Assessment 
Guidelines for Disaster Management”, SEC(2010), Brussels, 21.12.2010, European Commission. 
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opposed to risk curves. Figure 2 shows an example of a risk matrix for Cologne using 
examples of the risk arising from the three hazards shown in Figure 1. Included is the 
summation of the three risks that give an approximate loss of 100 million Euros. These 
examples are outlined by the ellipse, where the result of combining the windstorm (triangle), 
earthquake (diamond) and flood (square) is shown by the circle. One can see how the total 
risk has increased by its movement towards the right, in the case of this figure, moving from 
“Quite likely” to “Likely”. While it must be kept in mind that this figure is only intended for 
illustrative purposes, one can imagine, based on expert opinion, how the relative distribution 
of the risks (i.e., the colour scheme) could be altered to better reflect the case at hand.  
 
Figure 2:  Risk matrix showing how combining the risk associated with individual risks (EQ – 
earthquake, FL – flood, WS – windstorm, see area) can lead to a significant increase in overall risk. 
The risk estimates discussed in the text (corresponding to losses of ca. 100 million Euros) 
are outlined by the ellipse. Note, we divided the loss and probability ranges in Figure 1 into 5 
and allocated the frequency and severity accordingly, while the colour scheme employed is 
purely illustrative and would require expert judgement to properly be assigned. 
 
Next we compare for specific return periods the range of results for each risk type newly 
calculated for the Cologne test case. For the seismic risk, this involved a logic tree approach 
that considers a range of hazard input parameters and damage and vulnerability models, 
resulting in 180 estimates per return period (Tyagunov et al., 2013).  The flood estimates 
employed a hybrid probabilistic-deterministic coupled dyke breach/hydrodynamic model 
(IHAM, Vorogushyn et al., 2010), run in a Monte Carlo simulation. The windstorm risk was 
found using the Vienna Enhanced Resolution Analysis or VERA tool (Steinacker et al., 2006) 
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and the building damage estimation method of Heneka and Ruck (2008). All three employed 
the same metric (direct damage, residential buildings) and total costs (see D7.5 details). 
 
Again, we employ a simple means of determining if the risk arising from two independent 
hazards for specific return periods are the same.  This involves the Wilcoxon’s test, a 
distribution free ranking test that asks the specific question “Are the medians of the two 
distributions the same?” (Barlow, 1989). We compare a range of values for each pair of 
hazards (earthquake – flood, earthquake – windstorm, flood – windstorm) and apply a null 
hypothesis (to 0.05) that the question’s answer is in the affirmative. The test involves taking 
20 random samples from each pair of distributions, applying the Wilcoxon’s test, and doing 
so 10000 times.  This is to reduce the consequence of situations where the random 
selections of samples are clustered in some way. The return periods we examine are 200, 
500 and 1000 years for comparing earthquakes and floods, and 200 and 500 years for floods 
and windstorms, and windstorms and earthquakes (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparing the distribution of results for each pair of risks.  (a-c)  Floods (green, FL) and 
earthquakes (red, EQ) for (a) 200, (b) 500 and (c) 1000 years return periods, (d-e) floods and 
windstorms (blue, WS) for (d) 200 and (e) 500 years, (f-g) windstorms and earthquakes for (f) 200 and 
(g) 500 years. The vertical lines of the same colours are the respective medians. 
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Considering first the earthquake distribution, we see that its bimodal character (a product 
largely of the choice of the ground motion predictive equations, see D7.5) immediately adds 
an additional element of uncertainty as to whether the risks it is compared to are equivalent.  
Considering the results of the Wilcoxon’s test, we note for the 200 year return period (Figure 
3a) that earthquakes and floods are not equivalent (in contrast to Grünthal et al., 2006, 
where they appear very similar), but can be considered comparable for 500 years (Figure 3b, 
in agreement with Grünthal et al., 2006), although for 1000 years (Figure 3c), a definitive 
comment cannot be made. For the windstorms and floods (Figure 3d-e), for both the 200 
(Figure 3d) and 500 (Figure 3e) years return periods, it is obvious (even without applying this 
test) that windstorms and floods are not equivalent, with floods being of greater concern in 
both cases. Finally, for earthquakes and windstorms (Figure 3f-g), for 200 year return period 
(Figure 3f), these appear to be of equivalent importance, while for 500 years (Figure 3g), this 
does not appear to be the case (with earthquakes of greater importance), in both cases 
consistent with Grünthal et al. (2006). 
 
Closing comments 
 
We have presented here for the case of Cologne simple methods for combining risk curves, 
along with a means of graphically showing (risk matrix) how total risk changes as one 
combines the individual components. Such a presentation scheme is useful in showing how 
risk changes when interactions are considered (as shown by Mignan in this document3. We 
also examined a means of seeing if a pair of risks is equivalent to one another when 
considering a range of plausible values for a given return period. The relevance of such an 
exercise is to do with the decision making process, whereby if the risk associated with two 
types of hazard is “equivalent”, then the required mitigation schemes may need to consider 
both, or at least help decision makers when deciding on how to allocate resources. For 
example, while for 200 years return periods, earthquakes and windstorms appear to be 
equivalent, one would imagine that implementing mitigation actions for earthquake would be 
much more expensive than those for windstorms. It also shows that one needs to 
accommodate uncertainties, since simply using, for example, average curves, may yield 
misleading conclusions about the relative importance of a given combination of hazard types. 
However, it is also important to note that the actual results would vary as the range of 
employed input models and parameters are updated and refined (as would be apparent in 
the earthquake case). 
                                               
3
 Mignan, A. MATRIX Common IT sYstem (MATRIX CITY) Generic multi-hazard and multi-risk 
framework - the concept of Virtual City - IT considerations, this document. 
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Identifying and structuring scenarios of cascade events in 
the MATRIX project 
 
Alexander Garcia-Aristizabal(1), Angela Di Ruocco(1), Warner Marzocchi(1), Kevin 
Fleming(2), Sergey Tyagunov(2), Sergiy Vorogushyn(3), Stefano Parolai(1) and Nicolas 
Desramaut(4). 
 
(1) Analisi e Monitoraggio del Rischio Ambientale - Scarl, Naples, Italy. 
(2) Centre for Early Warning, Helmholtz-Centre Potsdam German Research Centre for Geosciences, 
Potsdam, Germany. 
(3) Section 5.4, Hydrology, Helmholtz-Centre Potsdam German Research Centre for Geosciences, 
Potsdam, Germany. 
(4) Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières, Orléans, France. 
 
Introduction 
 
The core of the probabilistic assessment of cascading effects within a multi-hazard problem 
consists of identifying the possible interactions that are likely to happen and that may result 
in an amplification of the expected damages within a given area of interest.  After a detailed 
review of the state of the art in multi-hazard assessment (MATRIX deliverable D3.1, Garcia-
Aristizabal et al., 2013a) and an exercise in defining the cascading effect scenarios of 
interest for the test cities of the MATRIX project  (MATRIX deliverable D3.3, Garcia-
Aristizabal et al., 2013b), we have developed a procedure for classifying the main kinds of 
interactions that can be considered for the quantitative assessment of cascading effects in a 
multi-risk analysis. In particular, we have identified two possible kinds of interactions, namely: 
(1) interactions at the hazard level, in which the occurrence of a given initial ‘triggering’ event, 
entails a modification to the probability of the occurrence of a secondary event, and (2) 
interaction at the vulnerability (or damage) level, in which the main interest is to assess the 
effects that the occurrence of one event (the first one occurring in time) may have on the 
response of the exposed elements against another event (that may be of the same kind as 
the former, but also a different kind of hazard).  Implicitly, a combination of both kinds of 
interactions is another possibility, hence in the discussion of the interactions at the 
vulnerability level, both dependent and independent hazards have been considered. 
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Identification and structuring of scenarios 
 
A fundamental initial step towards assessing cascading effects is the identification of 
possible scenarios.  The term “scenario” is used in a wide range of fields, resulting in 
different interpretations in practical applications.  In general, a scenario may be considered 
as a synoptic, plausible and consistent representation of an event or series of actions and 
events (e.g., MATRIX deliverable D3.3). In particular, it must be plausible because it needs 
to fall within the limits of what might conceivably happen, and must be consistent in the 
sense that the combined logic used to construct a scenario must not have any built-in 
inconsistencies. 
 
To achieve the required complete set of scenarios, different strategies can be adopted, 
ranging from event-tree to fault-tree strategies.  In many applications, an adaptive method 
combining both kinds of approaches is applied in order to ensure the exhaustive exploration 
of scenarios.   From the multi-risk assessment point of view, the cascading effects scenarios 
of primary interest are those that produce an amplified total risk when compared to the 
effects produced by the individual events.  With an appropriate set of cascading scenarios, 
their quantification can be achieved by adopting different strategies, for example, analysing 
databases of past events, performing physical modelling for the propagation of the intensity 
measures of interest, and/or by performing expert elicitations in order to obtain information 
for extremely complex problems, or in these cases with poor data or needing rapid analysis. 
 
Identification of scenarios in the MATRIX test cases 
 
To define some possible cascade scenarios, the ‘primary’ interactions between hazards were 
identified.  These can be understood as the pairs of hazards where it is theoretically possible 
to define an event that has the capacity to directly trigger another one (interaction at the 
hazard level), or in which the additive effects of the loads may lead to a risk amplification.  In 
the matrix-like Table 1, the different hazards considered in the MATRIX project are classified 
as triggering (running in the x-axis) against the ‘triggered’ (running in the y-axis) events.  In 
this case, all the possible ‘direct’ triggering effects are considered. It would also be obvious 
that it is physically impossible for some hazards to trigger another, e.g., wildfires and 
volcanoes (although the other way around is certainly a concern, especially for Naples). 
 
Table 2 is a modification of the previous one, where we try to highlight more complex 
cascade effects.  In this case, the number refers to the ‘level’ (i.e., the position in the 
sequence of events) at which the given phenomena may be triggered, starting from the initial 
- 15 - 
 
event being defined as level 0.  The numbers in this table are an attempt to represent the 
different possible sequences of events that can produce different chains of cascade events.  
Figure 1 in turn allows us to understand better the existing relationships between the different 
kinds of events and, their relative level in the chain.  In this way, the occurrence of different 
phenomena may be considered from the possible triggering factors. 
 
Table 1: Matrix of all possible direct interactions among the hazards considered within the MATRIX 
project. 
a, c
 In specific cases such as, for example, when a landslide (a) or a lava flow (c) reaches and blocks a river.
 
b
 For example, a volcanic edifice collapse. 
 
Summary of scenarios identified for the MATRIX test cases 
Naples test case. 
 
The possible cascading scenarios for the Naples test case are summarized in Table 3.  
Naples is in fact the test case that may have the largest collection of possible cascade 
events, with, as can be seen, cascades up to level 4 (landslides from volcanic eruptions) 
being identified. The most serious interactions appear to be volcanic-seismic relations, with a 
number of volcanic-related hazards possibly occurring or triggered. 
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Table 2: Cascades of more than 2 events for the hazards considered in the MATRIX project. 
 
d
In this case, it may be more properly defined as the triggering of volcanic unrest that eventually leads to an 
eruption. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagram showing the possible scenarios of cascading events among the hazards 
considered in the MATRIX project. 
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Cologne test case: 
 
The next case is Cologne, whose sequence of possible cascading effects scenarios is 
summarized in Table 4.  Cologne is in fact a much simpler example of cascading potential 
than either Naples or Guadeloupe, but nonetheless, earthquakes and floods display a 
potential interaction arising from the possibility of an earthquake damaging the flood 
defences along the River Rhine, hence increasing flood risk. 
 
Table 3: Possible event cascade scenarios for the Naples test case. 
d
In this case, it may be more properly defined as the triggering of volcanic unrest that eventually leads to an 
eruption. 
 
Guadeloupe islands: French West Indies 
 
The final test case, the island of Guadeloupe (French West Indies), is of a similar level of 
cascade event potential as Naples, although, for example, wild fires are not considered a 
serious danger.  The possible cascading effect scenarios for this case are summarized in 
Table 5.  Again, the earthquake-volcano interactions appear to be the most serious. 
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Table 4: Possible event cascade scenarios for the Cologne test case. 
*
Possible cascade effects proposed (GFZ): Earthquake -> Dyke damage -> Flooding 
 
 
Table 5: Possible event cascade scenarios for the French West Indies test case. 
d
In this case, it may be more properly defined as the triggering of volcanic unrest that eventually leads to an 
eruption. 
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Final comments 
 
From the different cascading scenarios identified in each test case, a set of specific 
scenarios of interest were selected for more quantitative analyses.  For example, in the 
Naples test case, two scenarios were analysed in quantitative terms: first, the effects of 
simultaneous loads caused by volcanic ash-fall (first effect) and earthquakes (second effect); 
second, the effects on the seismic hazard of the volcanic seismicity triggered during a 
volcanic unrest.   The results of these analyses are summarized in greater detail in the 
Naples test case deliverable (D7.3, Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2013c).  In the Guadeloupe 
(French West Indies) test case, a scenario consisting of landslides triggered by the 
occurrence of earthquakes after a cyclonic event or a heavy rainfall period was considered.  
The detailed analysis of this scenario is described in the Guadeloupe test case deliverable 
D7.4, Monfort and Lecacheux (2013).  Finally, in the Cologne test case, a scenario consisting 
of earthquake-triggered embankment failures and subsequent inundation of the City of 
Cologne has been analysed, with a detailed description of this scenario found in the Cologne 
test case deliverable D7.5, Fleming et al. (2013). 
 
The cascading scenarios identified for each test case were important input information to 
implement the multi-hazard and multi-risk framework developed within MATRIX.  This 
framework (MATRIX deliverable D5.2, Nadim et al., 2013) indeed provides a useful and 
valuable scheme within which to identify the characteristics of interactions between a given 
area’s hazard and risk environment, and an appropriate identification of interaction scenarios 
is a fundamental step in this process.  
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Introduction 
 
The MATRIX project aimed to develop methodologies to assess and compare some of the 
different natural risks that society has to face. Hence, in order to address multi-risks, one has 
to take into account the different interactions that might exist between the risks. These 
interactions, at the hazard and the vulnerability levels, might happen with different delays. It 
is, therefore, necessary to consider the temporal aspect of such interactions to properly 
assess multi-risk. The time dependencies might involve the following: 
 The repetition of events over time. 
 The concomitance of simultaneous-yet-independent events. 
 The succession of dependent phenomena (cascading events). 
The study of the time-dependency of vulnerability was the objective of work package 4 of the 
MATRIX project. 
 
Repetition of the same hazard events over time 
 
The effects of the repetition of a type of event have been studied by following a seismic 
example. The effects of fatigue due to the repetition of seismic shocks (the first mentioned 
above) within a physical vulnerability assessment have been analysed through two 
mechanical methodologies. The first approach, proposed by BRGM (Reveillere et al., 2012), 
developed damage-state dependent fragility functions (Figure1), while the second approach, 
performed by AMRA (Iervolino et al., 2014), analysed the multiple shock capacity reduction 
for non-evolutionary structural system (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1: Scheme of the time-dependent risk assessment methodology at a time t0. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulated damage evolution in the life-cycle. 
 
Concomitance of independent events and cascading scenario 
 
Another study within this work package developed a methodology to take into account the 
two other types of temporal dependency in societal impact studies. It has been applied to 
cascading events for illustrative purposes, but it could also be employed for concomitant, yet 
independent events. The major concern of the study was the integration of two different 
types of hazards into the evaluation of emergency system functionality during a crisis. The 
two hazards considered are earthquakes and induced landslides: the first one heavily 
damages the built environment, whereas the other only impacts upon the road network.  The 
functionality of the road network as a function of these events is modelled using the I2Sim4 
                                               
4
 http://www.i2sim.ca/ 
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platform developed at the University of British Columbia. This tool simulates the 
interdependencies between infrastructures and among them (Marti et al., 2008). 
 
The first step was the definition of a deterministic disaster scenario using several simulation 
tools to present a realistic earthquake and landslides scenario for the study area, which was 
Guadeloupe, Basse-Terre. The hazard cascading scenario consisted of a M6.3 earthquake 
striking Basse-Terre Island, and triggering landslides in the mountainous areas where 
previous rainfall events have made the area prone to mass movement (Figure 3). Damage 
due to the earthquake has been estimated for 5 considered systems (buildings, healthcare 
system, electrical network, water supply network and transportation, Figure 4). In our 
scenario, landslides mainly affect transportation networks, resulting in the closure of some 
roads. This physical damage was then introduced into the lifelines simulation tool (I2Sim), to 
convert the impacts on the physical integrity of the built environment (number of collapsed 
buildings, number of victims) into functional consequences (quantity of water and power 
available in the different cities, accommodation capacities, hospital treatment capacity and 
capacity of the transportation network to carry injured people to operational hospitals). 
 
 
Figure 3: Hazard cascading scenario: an earthquake (star, left) strikes and triggers landslides 
(resulting slope stability map, right) in the vicinity of the important RD23 road.  The stability factors 
relate to the potential for landslides along a slope, with values lower than 1 indicating a significant 
landslide hazard. 
 
Systemic vulnerability: inter and intra dependencies between systems 
 
Using the I2Sim tool, the functionality of each element is therefore the combination of the 
physical (direct damage), as well as functional (indirect) damage. Analyses were performed 
for different strategies of resource allocations, with one of the final results being the impact of 
the induced landslides upon the health care treatment capacity of the island.  It was found 
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that some systems were very resilient, while others were more vulnerable during disaster 
situations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Interactions between hazards at the different levels (physical and functional vulnerability) as 
examined in the scenario described in this work. 
 
By examining all of the simulation results, several conclusions can be made for the particular 
earthquake scenario simulated. It was found that the transportation system in Guadeloupe 
proved to be a major weak point during disaster response. The only route connecting the 
east and west sides of the Basse-Terre Island, the RD23 road (see Figure 3) is vulnerable to 
landslides. The simulations proved that, combined with the increased levels of congestion, 
the evacuation speed would decrease dramatically with virtually no remedy available. Due to 
the characteristics of the island: i.e., a closed system with mountains in the centre, both the 
road network and the health care system have a low level of redundancy.  
 
General remarks 
 
Lifelines play a vital role, even under normal conditions. Therefore, during a crisis, the 
dependency on critical infrastructures is likely to be exacerbated. Indeed, systems have to be 
functional to provide rapid emergency responses. However, the different systems are 
interdependent and even if not directly damaged, they can have their functionality seriously 
reduced and even stopped due to damaged elements of other systems. Thus, it is necessary 
to take functional vulnerability into account in order to have a comprehensive multi-risk 
approach and to improve the robustness of assessments of the impact of natural hazards on 
society. 
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For example, the impacts of individual hazards, taken separately, might not significantly 
affect societies or alter system functionality, but might reduce redundancy, and therefore 
could increase the functional vulnerability of the system to another hazard. This work 
undertaken within the MATRIX project therefore aimed to analyse the effects of cascading 
events on interdependent systems and on the capacities of the health care system to treat 
the victims under damaged-lifeline conditions. Further details may be found in MATRIX 
deliverable D7.4, Monfort and Lecacheux (2013). 
 
References 
 
Iervolino, I., Giorgio, M. and Chioccarelli, E. (2014), Closed-form aftershock reliability of 
damage-cumulating elastic-perfectly-plastic systems, Earthquake Engineering and 
Structural dynamics, Vol. 43, pp. 613-625 
Marti, J.R., Hollman, J.A., Ventura, C., Jatskevich, J., (2008) ‘Dynamic recovery of critical 
infrastructures: real-time temporal coordination’, International Journal of Critical 
Infrastructures, Vol. 4, Nos. 1/2, pp.17–31. 
Monfort, D. and Lecacheux, S. (2013). French West Indies test case, Deliverable D7.4, New 
methodologies for multi-hazard and multi-risk assessment methods for Europe (MATRIX 
project), contract No. 265138. 
Réveillère, A., Gehl, P., Seyedi, D., and Modaressi, H. (2012). Development of seismic 
fragility curves for mainshock-damaged reinforced concrete structures. In: Proc. 15th 
World Conference of Earthquake Engineering (WCEE); September 24-28, 2012, Lisbon, 
Portugal. 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
 
- 27 - 
 
MATRIX Framework for multi-risk assessment 
 
Farrokh Nadim(1), Zhongqiang Liu(1), Bjørn Vidar Vangelsten(1), Alexander Garcia 
Aristizabal(2), Gordon Woo(3), Willy Aspinall(3), Kevin Fleming(4) and Pieter van 
Gelder(5). 
 
(1) Norwegian Geotechnical Institute, International Centre for Geohazards, Oslo, Norway. 
(2) Analisi e Monitoraggio del Rischio Ambientale - Scarl, Naples, Italy. 
(3) Aspinall & Associates, London, UK. 
(4) Centre for Early Warning, Helmholtz-Centre Potsdam German Research Centre for Geosciences, 
Potsdam, Germany. 
(5) Delft University of Technology, Delft, the Netherlands. 
 
Introduction 
 
Many regions of the world are exposed to and affected by several types of natural hazard. 
The assessment and mitigation of the risk posed by multiple natural and man-made threats 
at a given location requires a multi-risk analysis approach that is able to account for the 
possible interactions among the threats, including possible cascade events. Performing 
quantitative multi-risk analysis using the methodologies available today presents many 
challenges (e.g., Kappes et al., 2012, Marzocchi et al., 2012). The risks associated with 
different types of natural hazards, such as volcanic eruptions, landslides, floods, and 
earthquakes, are often estimated using different procedures and the produced results are not 
comparable. Furthermore, the events themselves could be highly correlated (e.g., floods and 
debris flows could be triggered by an extreme storm event), or one type of threat could be 
the result of another (e.g., a massive landslide that is triggered by an earthquake, an 
example of a cascade effect).  
 
It is obvious that a mathematically rigorous approach to multi-risk assessment that addresses 
all the challenges named above, as well as the uncertainties in all steps of the analysis, will 
be complicated and require resources and expertise. On the other hand, in many situations, 
the decision-maker in charge of risk management can identify the optimum alternative 
among the possible options without undertaking a detailed, rigorous multi-risk analysis. 
Therefore, the framework recommended herein is based on a multi-level approach where the 
decision-maker and/or the risk analyst will not need to use a more sophisticated model than 
what is required for the problem at hand, or what would be reasonable to use given the 
available information. 
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The recommended three-level framework for multi-risk assessment 
 
The recommended multi-risk assessment framework is a multi-level process which assumes 
that the end-user (decision-maker or risk analyst) has identified the relevant threats and has 
carried out an assessment of the risk(s) (again at the level of sophistication required for the 
problem at hand) associated with each individual hazard. Figure 1 shows the general steps 
of our multi-risk assessment framework. The overall multi-risk assessment process 
comprises the following stages: (1) risk assessment for single hazards, (2) level 1: qualitative 
multi-risk analysis, (3) level 2: semi-quantitative multi-risk analysis, and (4) level 3: 
quantitative multi-risk analysis. The details are described below. 
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Figure 1: Schematic view of the steps followed in the proposed multi-risk assessment framework. 
 
Level 1 Analysis 
 
Level 1 analysis comprises a flow chart type list of questions that guides the end-user as to 
whether or not a multi-type assessment approach is required.  These questions explicitly 
account for cascading hazards and dynamic vulnerability within the context of conjoint or 
successive hazards. Each question is supplied with an exhaustive list of answers that the 
user can choose from. This process is shown schematically in Figure 2. 
 
If the Level 1 results strongly suggest that a multi-type assessment is required, then the end-
user moves on to Level 2 to make a first-pass assessment of the effects of dynamic hazard 
and time-dependent vulnerability (see Figure 3). If cascading events are potentially a 
concern, the user goes directly to the Level 3 analysis. 
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Figure 2: The steps involved in the Level 1 multi-risk analysis. 
 
 
Level 2 Analysis 
 
In the Level 2 analysis, the interactions among hazards and dynamic vulnerability are 
assessed approximately using semi-quantitative methods. The steps involved in the Level 2 
analysis are shown in Figure 3a. 
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Figure 3: Level 2 multi-risk analysis. (a) The steps involved in the process.  (b) The matrix approach 
followed.  (c) The types of interactions that may arise. (d) Description of the mutual influences.  (e)  
The “scoring” system.  (f) The matrix with the resulting scores. 
 
To consider hazard interactions and time-dependent vulnerability, the suggested method in 
the Level 2 multi-risk analyses is a matrix approach based on system theory. Figure 3b-f 
shows an example to explain this approach (Modified after de Simeoni et al., 1999 and 
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Kappes et al., 2010). First, a matrix is developed by means of the choice of a pair of hazards, 
considered as the basic components of the system (Figure 3b). It will be followed by a 
clockwise scheme of interaction (Figure 3c), with the description of the mutual influence 
between different hazards (Figure 3d). After the descriptions contained in the matrix, they are 
assigned numerical codes varying between 0 (No interaction) and 3 (Strong interaction) with 
intervals of 1, as a function of their degree of the interaction intensity (Figure 3e). Once all 
the hazards in the matrix are filled (Figure 3f), it is possible to verify the degree of the impact 
of each hazard on the others and the effect from other hazards. In order to avoid the 
excessive weighting of a single hazard, the hazard interaction index HI, which is the sum of 
the codes for all the off-diagonal terms, is evaluated and compared to a threshold value.  
 
The maximum possible value for the total sum of causes and effects is: 
 
        HI, max = 23n(n – 1) = 6n(n – 1)          (1) 
 
where n  is the number of hazards and HI is the hazard interaction index. 
 
Given the uncertainties and possible excessive or moderate weighting of single hazards, a 
threshold hazard interaction index HI equal to 50% of HI,max is recommended for considering 
a detailed Level 3 analysis. If the hazard interaction index is less than this threshold, Level 3 
analysis is not recommended because the additional accuracy gained by the detailed 
analyses is most likely within the uncertainty bounds of the simplified multi-risk estimates. 
Otherwise, if the hazard interaction index is greater than the threshold value, a detailed Level 
3 analysis is recommended. 
 
Level 3 Analysis 
 
In the Level 3 analysis, the interactions among hazards and dynamic vulnerability are 
assessed quantitatively with as high accuracy as the available data allow.  
 
 A new quantitative multi-risk assessment model based on Bayesian networks (BaNMuR, 
outlined in MATRIX deliverable D5.2, Nadim and Liu, 2013) is introduced to both estimate 
the probability of a triggering/cascade effect and to model the time-dependent vulnerability of 
a system exposed to multi-hazard.  A conceptual Bayesian network multi-risk model may be 
built as shown in Figure 4. To determine the whole risk from several threats, the network 
takes into account possible hazards and vulnerability interactions. This would include events 
that are: 
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(1) Independent, but threatening the same elements at risk with or without chronological 
coincidence (the column marked in orange in Figure 4), or 
(2) Dependent on one another or caused by the same triggering event or hazard; this is 
mainly the case for cascading or domino events (i.e., the column marked in green in 
Figure. 4). 
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Figure 4: Bayesian network for quantitative multi-risk assessment. 
 
Final Comments 
 
The framework presented in this chapter provides, at the very least, a starting point from 
which a decision-maker, risk-analyst etc., can proceed from their initial single-type 
assessment to a more comprehensive (if necessary) analysis.  In a later report in this 
document (Fleming et al., 2013, “The MATRIX framework applied to the test cases of 
Naples, Guadeloupe and Cologne”), aspects of the framework described here will be applied 
to the MATRIX test cases, namely Naples, Italy, French West Indies, and Cologne, 
Germany. 
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Summary 
 
 Dynamic risk processes have yet to be clearly understood and properly integrated into 
probabilistic risk assessments. While much attention has been given to this issue in recent 
times, most studies remain limited to specific multi-risk scenarios. Here we present the 
MATRIX Common IT sYstem (MATRIX-CITY), developed within the scope of work package 
7 of MATRIX (details are presented in MATRIX deliverable D7.2, Mignan, 2013).  MATRIX-
CITY is a first step towards a more general use of multi-risk tools in decision-making, and 
encompasses 3 major advances in the implementation of a multi-risk framework:  
1. The development of a generic probabilistic framework based on the sequential Monte 
Carlo method to implement coinciding events and triggered chains of events, as well as 
time-dependent vulnerability and exposure (Mignan et al., accepted), 
2. The proposition of guidelines for the implementation of multi-risk, using the concept of the 
“Virtual City” to test basic multi-risk concepts in a controlled, yet realistic, environment 
(Mignan et al., accepted), 
3. A better understanding of the IT requirements for the widespread use of multi-risk tools, 
based on the lessons learned from the development of an IT platform prototype (the 
"original MATRIX-CITY", Mignan, 2013) and from interactions with stakeholders. 
 
A generic multi-hazard and multi-risk framework: A "blue print" for extreme 
event assessment 
 
A sequential Monte Carlo method was proposed to generate a large number of risk scenarios 
(i.e., the generation of hazardous events and the computation of associated losses). The 
analysis of these simulated risk scenarios then allowed us to assess losses in a probabilistic 
way and to recognize more or less probable risk paths, including extremes or low-probability 
high-consequences chains of events. We finally found that “black swans”, which refer to 
unpredictable outliers, can only be captured by adding more knowledge about potential 
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interaction processes to the computation process. However, this can only be achieved over 
time by following a “brick-by-brick” approach given the considerable effort that is required. 
 
To quantify hazard interactions, we introduced the concept of the hazard correlation matrix 
(Figure 1a). We considered three categories of interactions: event repeat (e.g., Ai  Ai; C  
C), intra-hazard interaction (e.g., Ai  Aj) and inter-hazard interaction (e.g., Ai  Bj). The 
effect could be positive (i.e., probability increase) or negative (i.e., probability decrease), and 
temporary or long lasting. Time-dependent vulnerability and exposure are not described 
here, but are taken into account within the framework at a later stage of the calculations. To 
evaluate how multi-risk participates in the emergence of extremes, we additionally introduced 
the concept of the risk migration matrix and showed that risk migration and risk amplification 
are the two main causes for the occurrence of extremes (Figure 1b). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Main results from the proposed generic multi-risk framework. a. The concept of the hazard 
correlation matrix. Trigger events are represented in rows i and target/triggered events in columns j. 
Each cell indicates the 1-to-1 conditional probability of occurrence Pr(j|i). The n-to-1 conditional 
probability is considered by incorporating a memory element to the correlation matrix. The identifiers 
A, B, C, D and E represent different types of perils. b. The risk migration matrix, a multi-risk metric that 
shows how risk changes as a function of frequency and aggregated losses when new information is 
added to the system (here adding cascading effects A  C  D  E as defined in a.). An increase of 
risk is represented in red and a decrease in blue. The points represent the individual risk scenarios, 
where black indicates those where interactions are considered and white where they are not. Source: 
Mignan et al. (accepted). Figure 1b is also available from the Appendix of Komendantova et al. (2014). 
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The Virtual City concept: Guidelines for shifting from abstract processes to 
realistic processes 
  
The multi-risk framework was developed and tested based on generic data and processes 
generated following the heuristic method. This strategy, which involves the use of intuitive 
judgment and simple rules, allows for the solving of problems that are otherwise difficult to 
consider. Our approach follows the existing recommendations on extreme event 
assessment, which involves the use of inductive generalizations and "scientific imagination" 
to include known examples of extremes, as well as potential "surprise" events within the 
same framework. However, abstract concepts, such as the definition of generic perils (e.g., A 
to E, Figure 1), remain difficult to comprehend and we therefore proposed some guidelines to 
help risk modellers and decision-makers apply this approach to realistic cases. For this 
purpose, we developed the concept of the Virtual City (Figure 2). Within this concept or tool, 
the perils A, B, C, D and E are no longer simply abstract concepts, but are replaced, for 
instance, by earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, fluvial floods and storms. Hazard, 
exposure and vulnerability data, as well as details about possible interacting processes, are 
based on real examples obtained from the scientific literature. 
 
 
Figure 2: (left) The virtual region in which the Virtual City is located. (right) The considered perils 
include: earthquakes (EQ), volcanic eruptions (VE), landslides (LS), fluvial floods (FL), wind events 
(WI), sea submersion (SS, e.g., storm surge or tsunami) and asteroid impacts (AI). Also included, but 
not shown, are NaTech (Natural Technological) events, i.e., technological accidents triggered by a 
natural event. Source: Mignan et al. (in preparation). A previous, simpler, version is shown in 
Komendantova et al. (2014). 
 
IT considerations: Planning the widespread use of multi-hazard and multi-risk 
tools by decision makers 
  
A prototype version of an IT platform for multi-risk loss estimations was developed during the 
first part of the project, the so-called MATRIX Common IT sYstem - or MATRIX-CITY 
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(Mignan, 2013). While based on state-of-the-art software engineering and a Python-based 
code, it was rapidly observed that multi-risk software would need to have all the 
functionalities of existing risk tools, on top of the innovative multi-risk framework described 
previously. Such a task would require significant resources and a commitment of modellers 
used to other types of risk modelling tools (including various procedures and formats). At this 
present stage, we recommend the exporting of the method developed for this IT tool to 
existing risk tools, which would facilitate its implementation and potentially encourage the 
widespread use of the proposed approach, as explained in Figure 3. 
  
Concluding comments 
 
The present work should be seen as a proof-of-concept, as we did not intend to fully resolve 
the complex problem of low probability-high consequence events. We only considered a 
selected number of possible interactions, where naturally adding more perils and interactions 
would yield more complex risk patterns. We thus recommend a brick-by-brick approach to 
the modelling of multi-risk, to progressively reduce epistemic uncertainties. A more realistic 
modelling of low-probability high-consequences events would also require the consideration 
of additional aspects, such as uncertainties, domino effects in socio-economic networks and 
long-term processes, such as climate change, infrastructure ageing and exposure changes. 
While the concepts developed in the present study outline the theoretical benefits of multi-
risk assessment, identifying their real-world practicality will require the application of the 
proposed framework to real test sites. 
 
 
Figure 3: A paradigm shift in risk assessment? a. The structural differences between standard risk 
modelling and the newly proposed multi-risk approach. MCM refers to the sequential Monte Carlo 
Method. Such an approach could be exported to existing risk tools. Source: Mignan et al. (under 
revision); b. Discussion with stakeholders at the PPRD
5
 South 2012 Lisbon workshop on multi-risk. 
                                               
5
 http://www.euromedcp.eu/index.php 
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The needs of decision makers must be taken into account to facilitate the communication and use of 
multi-risk approaches (see also Komendantova et al., 2014). 
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Introduction 
 
Existing risk assessment methods integrate large volumes of data and sophisticated 
analyses, as well as different approaches to risk quantification.  However, the key question is 
why do losses from natural disasters continue to grow if our scientific knowledge on multi-risk 
is increasing? (White et al., 2001). As Kappes et al. (2012) stated in their review on multi-
hazard risk assessment, to be able to understand this question, we need to also examine the 
frameworks employed in the field of risk management, as well as the interactions between 
science and practice in terms of knowledge transfer and the applicability of results. Our work 
deals with the questions of communication and the transfer of scientific knowledge on multi-
risk and its underlying drivers to stakeholders within the decision-making process. A two-way 
communication process has allowed us to not only collect feedback from stakeholders (i.e., 
civil protection offices) across Europe on the usability of the multi-risk decision–support tools 
that have the potential to benefit decision-makers and to provide them with information on 
mitigation measures, but also to integrate their feedback into improving the tools themselves.  
 
The theoretical background of our work involves the concept of risk governance, which takes 
into account cultural and political factors when implementing risk mitigation measures and 
emphasizes the role of participation and communication. The risk governance concept is 
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concerned with such issues as how information is perceived, collected and communicated, 
and, based on these factors, how management decisions are made (IRGC, 2005).  
Participatory modelling is an important part of risk governance and allows us to take into 
consideration not only facts, but also values by collecting feedback from stakeholders 
(Forester, 1999). The process of interacting with stakeholders leads to an enhanced 
understanding of the views, criteria, preferences and trade-offs employed in decision-making 
(Antunes et al., 2006).  Also, as social science scholars argue, because the development of 
scientific tools is also a social process, it is essential to involve relevant stakeholders who will 
be using the tools in the design process through the collection and integration of their 
feedback (Tesh, 1990). 
 
Two complementary decision-making tools developed within the context of the MATRIX 
project are discussed here:  
 (1) A generic framework developed by ETH Zurich and which is the subject of another 
report in this deliverable (MATRIX deliverable D7.2, Mignan, 2013, Mignan, 2014, this 
report), and  
 (2) An evaluation methodology based on the concept of the risk matrix that incorporates 
expert knowledge through stakeholder interactions into multi-hazard scenario 
development, developed by the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) (Wenzel, 
2012).  
 
Feedback for decision-making tools 
 
This research was motivated by the gap in the scientific literature about feedback with 
respect to the usability of decision-support tools. While the use of feedback for the 
development of decision-support tools for environmental issues has been reported 
(Constanza and Ruth, 1998), as well as there being multi-risk decision–support tools that 
have the option of collecting feedback (T6, 2007), there is no evidence or analysis of the 
feedback from stakeholders from practice on the usability of multi-risk decision-support tools. 
During our work, we not only collected such feedback from civil protection officers, but we 
also used this information to improve the developed decision-making tools, directly 
integrating stakeholders’ perceptions into the model by attributing different weights to loss 
parameters according to preferences from stakeholders.  The information was gained during 
two workshops, namely a MATRIX stakeholders’ meeting in Bonn (July, 2012) and a 
workshop on urban multi-hazard risk assessment in Lisbon6 (October, 2012), and from a 
                                               
6
 Multi-hazard Risk Assessment in Urban Environment, 18-19 October 2012, Lisbon, Portugal, PPRD 
South program 
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questionnaire distributed prior to the first workshop. The selection of the stakeholders forms 
a representative sample, given the fact that our stakeholders´ consultation process covered 
most European countries, with a majority of them representing National Platforms, as well as 
the UNISDR.   
 
A presentation of the generic multi-risk framework (tool #1) in Lisbon involved a half-day 
exercise, where one of the tasks required investigating the different hazards presented in the 
used examples, based on data such as hazard maps and to give some score to their severity 
and frequency within the concept of the risk matrix - hence combining the tool #1 core 
modelling concept with a visualization and ranking of multi-risk similar to tool #2.  In fact, this 
represented an upgrade of tool #1, based on feedback obtained during the Bonn workshop.  
An exercise involving tool #2 was presented at the Bonn workshop, in which stakeholder 
input was needed to identify the weights with which the impact of particular components of 
the model are specified in a participatory fashion (i.e., what is the relative importance of the 
different loss parameters in the risk ranking?). Thus, the primary difficulty in gathering 
stakeholder input involved creating a “value model” that would support stakeholders in 
assessing problems and expressing their views more explicitly. 
 
The general results show that for the usage of multi-risk decision-support tools, two areas 
are most problematic. These are (1) the absence of clear definitions and (2) the lack of 
information on the added value of multi-risk assessment. Multi-risk is not systematically 
addressed among the EU countries for all hazards, but is only singularly integrated into risk 
assessment approaches. Some examples include the superposition of existing single hazard 
risk prevention plans for all hazards, for example, combining flood and landslide hazards and 
flood risks with wind effects, the application of which is within the context of risk assessment 
of critical infrastructure, in particular the combination of meteorological and technological 
risks. Generally, multi-risk analysis is barely or not at all integrated into decision-making 
processes, and only around half of stakeholders were aware of methodologies and tools to 
assess multi-risk. 
 
The reaction of stakeholders to the multi-risk assessment and decision-making tools 
presented at the both workshops was optimistic. Several stakeholders invited the developers 
of these tools to give presentations and to conduct training on the tools at their home 
institutions. The majority of stakeholders would consider the use of the generic multi-risk 
framework (tool #1) and the decision-making tool (tool #2) after their testing phase. However, 
the usability of the tools in practice is complicated by such factors as the required large 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.euromedcp.eu/index.php 
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volume of input parameters, which involves cumbersome data gathering to consider multiple 
hazards and risks in a given region, and that their possible application is limited to only a 
narrow number of experts as high-level expertise is required to assess the dynamic multi-
hazard and multi-risk processes, taking into account the complexity of the models and the 
required parameters. 
 
The consultation process with stakeholders also showed significant variation in perceptions 
between stakeholders in academia and in practice. While both academicians and 
practitioners agreed that the decision-support tools are useful for understanding losses and 
their contributions in a risk scenario, differences arise between how practitioners viewed the 
usefulness of the tools when it comes to prioritizing risk and developing risk management 
strategies. Similarly, practitioners found the tools less useful than academics when it comes 
to preparing for disasters and allocating resources. 
 
Closing comments 
 
We have collected recommendations on two possible areas involving the application of 
decision-support tools. The first is in the more narrow sense of convincing stakeholders 
involved in the decision-making process of the usefulness of the multi-hazard approach. The 
second deals with the broader view of disseminating these results to the general public, 
hence confronting public acceptance issues. Some stakeholders expressed the opinion that 
politicians could use such models as training to see what the consequences of a multi-
hazard situation could be. Another general recommendation was that the decision-support 
tools could be used for educational purposes. 
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Introduction 
 
One of the objectives of the MATRIX project was the development of a conceptual 
framework that could be applied to multi-hazard and multi-risk environments. The developed 
framework (MATRIX deliverable D5.2, Nadim et al., 2013, Liu and Nadim, 2013) involves 
several levels of analysis of increasing sophistication, an overview of which is provided in 
another reference report in this document7.  It is therefore the aim of this chapter to present 
some results of a simplified application of this framework to the MATRIX test cases, namely 
Naples, Italy, Guadeloupe, French West Indies, and Cologne, Germany.  All three test cases 
represent multi-hazard and risk environments, although with differing degrees and 
complexities of hazard and risk interactions.  As outlined in the overview of the framework, 
one of the aims was to develop a system whereby a decision-maker or end-user could 
identify how much effort is actually required (also dependent upon the available resources) 
by answering a series of questions, and then deciding whether a complete, quantitative multi-
risk analysis is necessary for the case at hand. 
 
The MATRIX test cases 
 
In order to verify the concepts and tools developed within MATRIX, it is necessary to apply 
them to real world situations where conjoint and cascading events and interactions between 
                                               
7
 Nadim et al., 2013 “MATRIX framework for multirisk assessment”, 
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different hazards and risks need to be considered.  It is for this reason, and matching the 
expertise of the consortium, that the MATRIX test cases were chosen.  All three are under 
threat from multiple hazards (see MATRIX deliverable D3.3, Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2013a, 
and Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2013 “Identifying and structuring scenarios of cascade events in 
the MATRIX project”, this document). Naples (MATRIX deliverable D7.3, Garcia-Aristizabal 
et al., 2013b) and Guadeloupe (MATRIX deliverable D7.4, Monfort and Lecacheux, 2013) 
are the most threatened (and complex) examples, with both endangered by volcanic 
eruptions, earthquakes, as well as hurricanes (Guadeloupe), landslides (Naples and 
Guadeloupe) and forest fires (Naples).  Each case is also susceptible to cascading events, in 
particular rain- and earthquake-induced landslides and volcano-earthquake interactions. 
Cologne (MATRIX deliverable D7.5, Fleming et al., 2014) on the other hand is not as 
exposed to such a range of hazards, nonetheless it must still contend with threats from 
earthquakes, floods and windstorms (Grünthal et al., 2006), with the possibility of 
earthquake-induced damage to its dyke system increasing the flood risk to the city. 
 
The MATRIX multi-risk framework 
 
As the framework is outlined in another chapter of this document (Nadim et al., 2014), we will 
only present the barest details here.  In summary, it consists of four levels: 
 Single hazard(s) risk assessment (Figure 1 of Nadim et al., 2014). 
 Level 1 – Qualitative analysis – decides if a multi-type assessment is required (Figure 2 
of Nadim et al., 2014). 
 Level 2 – Semi-quantitative analysis – identifies the various interactions between 
hazards (Figure 3 of Nadim et al., 2014). 
 Level 3 – Quantitative analysis – the interactions between hazards, time-dependent 
vulnerability and the accompanying uncertainties are estimated. 
 
As commented upon earlier, by considering a series of questions, a decision maker or 
stakeholder can decide if it is necessary to proceed to a higher level. Considering Level 1, 
the answers for each test case being presented in Table 1, we note immediately that for each 
example, we must proceed from the initial “More than one hazard?” question to dealing with 
the various interactions, with the need for at least a Level 2 analysis. However, even if this 
were not the case, i.e., only one hazard of concern, then there is also the possibility of events 
of the same kind repeating during a given time period, which may be taken as the time 
required to carry out the necessary repairs/recovery from the original event (e.g., a series of 
storms separated by short periods of time).  We also note that for all three cases, we would 
probably need to proceed to a quantitative Level 3 analysis, based on the fact that cascade 
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events may arise. However, the fact that cascade events in Naples and Guadeloupe are 
more likely than in Cologne cannot, at this stage of an assessment (or comparison), be 
resolved. In addition, the cascade example for Cologne presented, i.e., an earthquake 
damaging flood defences, hence increasing flood risk, would also fit within the context of 
conjoint events.  Therefore, it would appear that even the most “quiet” territories may be 
exposed to several hazards, with interactions potentially always present (for example, Na-
Tech - Natural Technological - interactions are in many industrialised districts a major 
concern, although they are not dealt with in detail in MATRIX).  Hence, one may expect the 
situation where only a Level 1 assessment is required would be fairly rare. 
 
 Naples Guadeloupe Cologne 
More than 1 
hazard 
(YES) 
Earthquakes, 
volcanoes, tsunamis, 
storms, landslides, 
forest fires, floods. 
Earthquakes, volcanoes, 
tsunamis, storms 
(hurricanes), landslides, 
floods (rains, storm, 
surges). 
Earthquakes, flooding 
(river), windstorms. 
Hazard 
interactions 
(YES) 
 
Possible 
cascades:
8
 
Volcano-earthquake 
interactions 
Earthquake – landslides 
Volcanoes – wildfires 
Heavy precipitation 
(flood) – landslides 
Volcano-earthquake 
interactions 
Volcano/earthquake- 
tsunamis 
Earthquake – landslides 
Heavy precipitation 
(floods) – landslides 
Earthquake damaging a 
loaded dyke, causing 
flooding (conjoint event). 
 
Affects 
triggering with 
some time 
delay 
Increased landslide risk 
after heavy rainfalls, 
e.g., an earthquake 
soon after heavy rains, 
when the soils are 
saturated and thus more 
susceptible. 
Increased landslide risk 
after heavy rainfalls. 
Increased flood risk 
arising from unrepaired 
dykes following an 
earthquake 
Potential 
interactions 
due to 
mitigation 
measures 
This has not been 
considered within this 
work.  While increasing 
a house’s height could 
reduce loss due to 
flooding, it may increase 
loss due to earthquake. 
Not considered in this 
work. Some retrofitting 
actions against cyclones 
or floods may increase 
seismic vulnerability if 
proper attention is not 
given to earthquake 
design issues 
Location of dykes may 
shift the flood risk 
spatially. 
Time-
dependent 
vulnerability 
Earthquake-Earthquake 
interactions; 
Earthquake-Landslide 
interactions 
Time-dependent 
vulnerability in buildings is 
considered in this work; 
however, landslide 
potential varies during the 
year owing to the 
changing levels of water 
saturation. 
The main issue would be 
the vulnerability of the 
defences to seismic 
loading, depending upon 
the water levels. 
 
Table 1:  The answers to the questions posed as part of Step 1 of the framework (Figure 1). 
                                               
8
 See Deliverable D3.3 “Scenarios of cascade events”, Garcia-Aristizabal et al. (2013a) 
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Considering the Level 2 assessment, the aim is to describe the various relationships 
between the assorted hazards. This is done by following a matrix approach (modified after de 
Simeoni et al., 1999 and Kappes et al., 2010), the results for the three test cases being 
presented in Figure 1 (again, please refer to Figure 3 of Nadim et al., 2014, this document).  
To read these figures, consider first that along the diagonal, the hazards of concern are 
listed.  Then, moving in a clockwise manner, the level of interaction (scored between 0 and 3 
with intervals of 1, where 3 indicates a strong interaction and 0 indicates none) and the 
nature of such interactions between each hazard pair are identified. 
 
 
Figure 1:  The hazard interaction matrix means of identifying the type and magnitude of the various 
interactions possible for the MATRIX test cases (0 – no interaction, 3 – strong interaction).  Note, only 
some examples for Naples and Guadeloupe are included. 
 
For Naples and Guadeloupe (Figure 1a and 1b), for the purpose of this work, we simply refer 
to three hazards, although obviously a larger matrix would be needed to be employed for a 
thorough study.  We note the strong (3) interactions between some hazards, e.g., 
earthquakes and volcanoes for Naples, landslides and earthquakes for Guadeloupe, as well 
as hazards where no interaction would arise (e.g., hurricanes and earthquakes). Considering 
Cologne (Figure 1c), we identify few interactions between hazards, i.e., windstorms 
potentially bringing heavy rain, although for Cologne, more localised heavy precipitation 
causes little widespread flooding, and an earthquake damaging flood defences.  However, it 
is also recognized that if we considered this at the risk level, then a windstorm may damage 
a building, increasing its susceptibility to a later earthquake, while considering the reverse 
(an initial earthquake followed by a windstorm) would most likely be more serious.  Based on 
the numbers presented in each square, a so-called hazard interaction index may be inferred 
(found by adding all results row by row, representing causes, then column by column, 
representing effects), the size of which relative to some criteria (e.g., a predefined 
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percentage of the maximum possible index for a given site) may decide whether or not to 
proceed to the more resource intensive Level 3 analysis.  For example, Naples has a score 
of 16 and Guadeloupe 12, while Cologne has a value of only 4, indicating as expected the 
much great importance of such interactions for the first two cases.  
 
Finally, an attempt to consider a quantitative Level 3 analysis was carried out for Naples, 
considering volcano-earthquake interactions at the hazard and vulnerability levels (see 
MATRIX deliverable D3.4, Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2013c). For the hazard level, the 
contribution to seismic hazard by volcanic earthquakes during periods of volcanic unrest was 
assessed.  Likewise, the combined effects of ash loads deposited over roofs and seismic 
loading were considered in order to estimate their effects on the risk quantification.  It was 
found that because of the characteristics of the volcanic seismic swarms (shallow and 
generally small events), their contribution to seismic hazard is strongly localized around the 
epicentre zone of the events and quickly vanishes with distance. Conversely, the combined 
effects of seismic and volcanic ash loads increases the average risk by an order of 3% to 6% 
(with respect to calculations that don’t take into consideration the effects of volcanic ash).  
Furthermore, a scenario-based analysis considering specific ash-load scenarios was also 
undertaken, with more specific amplification effects observed.  Such scenario-based 
analyses can provide important information for short-term assessments. 
 
Final comments 
 
The multi-hazard and risk framework developed within MATRIX provides a useful and 
valuable scheme within which to identify the characteristics of interactions between a given 
area’s hazard and risk environment.  Although not all hazards for Naples and Guadeloupe 
are considered in the level 2 assessment, one can still see that this framework shows the 
much stronger need for the more complex analysis for Naples and Guadeloupe than for 
Cologne. 
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Introduction 
 
In risk assessment research and policy, there is currently much debate on multi-type hazard 
and risk assessment and the definition and use of realistic scenarios. This debate has been 
evoked, not least, by several specific disasters in recent years that have resulted in 
extremely high numbers of fatalities and massive damage to properties and infrastructure. 
Recent examples are the Super Typhoon Haiyan, which hit the Philippines in November 
2013, causing floods and landslides, and the Tohoku earthquake that struck Japan in March 
2011, with the resulting devastating tsunami and nuclear accident. 
 
The research undertaken in MATRIX Work package 6 “Decision support for mitigation and 
adaptation in a multi-hazard environment” aimed at providing guidance on how to maximize 
the benefits arising from, and overcome the barriers to, the implementation of a multi-hazard 
and risk assessment approach within current risk management regimes.  
 
This reference report focuses on the synthesising the identified benefits and barriers to multi-
hazard mitigation and adaption9. It is addressed to practitioners within the public/private 
sector working in communities exposed to multiple risks as well as to those active at the 
science-policy interface, thus including researchers, policy and decision makers in risk and 
emergency management. 
                                               
9
 Deliverable D6.4 “Synthesis” Scolobig et al. (2013) 
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Research design 
 
The research design was grounded on documentary analyses and extensive empirical work 
involving policy makers, private sector actors, and researchers in risk and emergency 
management. The work was informed by thirty-six semi-structured interviews, three 
workshops (Figure 1) with over seventy practitioners in total attending, feedback from 
questionnaires and focus groups discussions. Most of the fieldwork was conducted in two of 
the MATRIX test sites: Naples (Southern Italy) and Guadeloupe (French West Indies). 
Lessons learnt from five historical multi-hazard disasters have been also included, as well as 
examples reported from practitioners representing eleven countries (Italy, France, Norway, 
Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Sweden, United Kingdom, Iceland, Croatia, Austria). This lead 
to practical and evidence-based recommendations that are informed by a well-researched 
understanding of the process through which new knowledge about multi-hazard and risk 
assessment can be taken advantage of by practitioners. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A workshop with practitioners organised in Naples, Italy. 
 
From multi-risk assessment to multi-risk governance 
 
Within current single-risk-centred governance systems (which have evolved in parallel with 
the single-risk-centred risk assessment processes), practitioners hardly ever have the 
opportunity to discuss multi-risk issues, including triggered events, cascade effects and the 
rapid increase in vulnerability resulting from successive hazards. However, as revealed by 
the workshop results, risk and emergency managers clearly see the benefits of including a 
multi-risk approach in their everyday activities, especially in the urban planning sector, but 
also in emergency management and risk mitigation (see the chapter in this document by 
Komendantova et al.). 
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Benefits of a multi-risk viewpoint 
 
As one example of how a multi-risk viewpoint would be of value, practitioners believe that 
decisions on building restrictions for urban planning would benefit greatly from the results of 
multi-risk assessment. A multi-risk approach is considered particularly useful also for gaining 
a holistic view of all of the possible risks that may affect a territory. For example, such an 
approach can show that focusing only on the impacts of one hazard could result in raising 
the vulnerability of the area to another type of hazard. For example volcanic ash can have an 
additive effect on seismic loads.  Another example of this is in the older buildings of Kobe, 
Japan, which were built with relatively heavy roofs.  This helped to mitigate against the 
frequent typhoons, but enhanced their vulnerability to rarer earthquakes. 
 
Other benefits that are considered to be particularly crucial by practitioners include: the cost 
reductions and improvements in the efficiency of proposed risk mitigation actions; the 
development of new partnerships between agencies working on different types of risks; an 
awareness of the potential for expected losses being exceeded (i.e., the total risk is possibly 
greater than the sum of the individual parts), as well as the lives and property saved and 
better protected by the use of a multi- vs. single-risk approach. However, further research is 
still needed in order to better understand the extent of some of these benefits, as well as the 
need to consider aspects of the mitigation problem, such as the different time scales involved 
between the events themselves, response, initial recovery and ongoing mitigation. Our 
results also reveal that practitioners and researchers have in mind different agendas for 
future research on multi-risk assessment.  Therefore, a transparent process to reach a 
compromise on the required priorities is needed. 
 
Barriers  
 
Barriers to an effective implementation of multi-risk assessment can be found in both the 
science and practice domains. For example, considering scientific contributions to risk 
assessment research, the process has evolved differently in the fields dealing with geological 
versus meteorological hazards, with the different scientific development paths representing a 
major barrier to understanding and communicating between different “risk communities”. 
Accompanying this is the lack of open access to databases and research results, which is 
particularly worrying for risk managers. Overarching these problems are the matters of the 
lack of interagency cooperation and communication, which are particularly difficult for risks 
that are managed by authorities acting at different levels (e.g., in Naples, national bodies are 
responsible for volcanic risk, while river basin authorities deal with flood risk). The lack of 
- 54 - 
 
capacities at the local level and unsatisfactory public-private partnerships are also major 
barriers that need to be confronted. 
 
Catalysts for the effective implementation of multi-risk assessment 
 
As a result of our interactions and discussions with stakeholders, some priority actions have 
been identified:  
 Encourage knowledge exchange and dialogue between the risk communities dealing with 
geological and meteorological hazards; 
 Identify new options for mitigation, - e.g., multi-risk insurance schemes, new forms of 
public-private responsibility sharing for households exposed to multi-risks; 
 Develop territorial platforms for data and knowledge exchange between researchers and 
practitioners; 
 Create an inter-agency environment, where the different departments at the national 
and/or regional governmental level, can exchange information, develop complementary 
protocols, and serve to provide consistent information and responses to the relevant 
stakeholders; 
 Create commissions for discussion at the local/municipal level ("local multi-risk 
commissions") in order to gain a common understanding of what multi-risk assessment 
actually is, what kind of cooperative actions can be undertaken to implement it, what are 
the priorities for future research etc.. Members of these commissions should be decision 
and policy makers, researchers and local natural hazard advisors, the latter acting as the 
liaising bodies between local communities and practitioners.  
 
Additional information and references 
 
Work package 6 of the MATRIX project produced four deliverables based upon the 
conceptual and empirical work of an interdisciplinary team of researchers, integrating 
expertise from the physical, environmental and social sciences.  The interested reader is 
referred to them. 
 
Komendantova, N., van Erp N., van Gelder, P. and Patt, A. (2013) Individual and cognitive 
barriers to effective multi-hazard and multi-risk decision-making governance, Deliverable 
D6.2, New methodologies for multi-hazard and multi-risk assessment methods for Europe 
(MATRIX project), contract No. 265138. 
Scolobig, A., Vichon, C., Komendantova, N., Bengoubou-Valerius, M. and Patt, A. (2013) 
Social and institutional barriers to effective multi-hazard and multi-risk decision-making 
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governance, Deliverable D6.3, New methodologies for multi-hazard and multi-risk 
assessment methods for Europe (MATRIX project), contract No. 265138. 
Scolobig A, Komendantova N, Patt A, Gasparini P, Di Ruocco A, Garcia-Aristizabal A,   
Vinchon C, Bengoubou-Valerius M, Monfort-Climent D, Wenzel F (2013) Synthesis: 
Benefits and barriers to multi-hazard mitigation and adaptation, with policy 
recommendations for decision-support, Deliverable D6.4 New methodologies for multi-
hazard and multi-risk assessment methods for Europe (MATRIX project), contract No. 
265138 (on which this reference report is based). 
Wenzel F (2012) Decision analytic frameworks for multi hazard mitigation and adaptation, 
Deliverable D6.1, New methodologies for multi-hazard and multi-risk assessment methods 
for Europe (MATRIX project), contract No. 265138. 
 
More information is available from the MATRIX website http://matrix.gpi.kit.edu/index.php.  
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Appendix: List of the deliverables resulting from the 
MATRIX projects 
 
The following table lists all of the deliverables produced during the MATRIX project.  These 
may be obtained from the MATRIX website (for the public document) or by directly contacting 
the project coordinator. 
 
Regarding the dissemination level, if a document is not PU, then the consortium may need to 
be contacted and, at the author’s discretion, the document will then be made available.   
 
PU - Public 
PP - Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)  
RE - Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services) 
CO - Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services). 
 
Number Name 
Lead 
partner 
Dissem. 
level 
D1.1 Kick off meeting report GFZ PU 
D1.2 1st period intermediate reports BRGM PP 
D1.3 2nd period intermediate and final reports GFZ PP 
D1.4 1st period scientific audit AMRA RE 
D1.5 2nd period and final scientific audit GFZ RE 
D2.1 
Single-type risk analysis procedures: Report on single-type risk 
analysis procedures in the framework of synoptical risk comparisons 
GFZ RE 
D2.2 
Uncertainty quantification: Report on uncertainty quantification and 
comparison for single-type risk analyses 
BGRM RE 
D2.3 
Harmonization strategy: Report on the optimal harmonization of single-
type assessment methodologies for achieving risk comparability. 
GFZ RE 
D3.1 
Review of existing procedures: Review of the existing procedures for 
multi-hazard assessment 
AMRA PP 
D3.2 Dictionary of terminology: Dictionary of terminology adopted. AMRA PP 
D3.3 
Scenarios of cascade events: Report on the description of the possible 
scenarios of cascade events. 
AMRA PP 
D3.4 
Probabilistic framework: Report describing the proposed probabilistic 
framework for multi-risk assessment. 
AMRA RE 
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Number Name 
Lead 
partner 
Dissem. 
level 
D3.5 
Software for multi-hazard assessment:  Software for multi-risk 
assessment. 
BRGM RE 
D4.1 
Fragility functions:  Impact of repeated events with various intensities 
on the fragility functions for a given building typology at local scale. 
BRGM CO 
D4.2 
Fragility of pre-damaged elements: Realisation of fragility functions of 
elements pre-damaged by other past events and demonstration on a 
scenario. 
BRGM CO 
D4.3 
Functional vulnerability: Report on the functional vulnerability 
assessment of a system prone to multiple hazards. 
BRGM PP 
D4.4 
Social and economic vulnerability: Report on the social and economic 
vulnerability to multiple hazards. 
IIASA PP 
D5.1 
State-of-the-art in multi-risk assessment: Review of the state-of-the-art 
in multi-risk assessment. 
AMRA PP 
D5.2 
Framework for multi-risk assessment: Framework for consistent multi-
risk assessment. 
NGI RE 
D5.3 
Tangible and intangible losses: Quantification of tangible and intangible 
losses in multi-risk assessment. 
IIASA RE 
D5.4 
Fault trees and event trees: Development of fault trees and event trees 
for environmental risks. 
TU-
Delft 
CO 
D5.5 
Uncertainties in multi-risk assessment: Treatment of uncertainties in 
multi-risk assessment. 
NGI CO 
D6.1 
Decision-analytic frameworks for multi-hazard mitigation and adaption: 
Review of the literature on decision analytic methods, and identify 
those best suited to multi-hazard cases through the application in a 
virtual city context. 
KIT PU 
D6.2 
Individual barriers to multi-hazard analysis: Identify the cognitive and 
cultural barriers to effective decision-making for individuals, and 
present experimental results used to test their application to multi-
hazard cases. 
IIASA RE 
D6.3 
Social and institutional barriers to effective multi-hazard decision-
making: Report on case study analysis, including empirical work with 
stakeholders, to identify the social and institutional constraints and 
opportunities to effective multi-hazard mitigation and adaptation. 
IIASA RE 
D6.4 
Synthesis: Synthesis: Benefits and barriers to multi-hazard mitigation 
and adaptation, with policy recommendations for decision-support. 
IIASA PP 
D7.1 
MATRIX common IT platform: Report on the MATRIX common IT 
platform 
ETHZ CO 
D7.2 
Implementation of the Virtual City: Implementation and analysis of the 
Virtual City 
ETHZ RE 
D7.3 Naples test case: Report on Naples test case. AMRA RE 
D7.4 
French West Indies test case: case: Report on French West Indies test 
case 
BRGM RE 
D7.5 Cologne test case: Report on Cologne test case. GFZ RE 
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Number Name 
Lead 
partner 
Dissem. 
level 
D8.1 
Project web portal: Project web portal and data repository system 
online. 
KIT PU 
D8.2 
Communication strategy: Communication strategy and promotional 
material, brochures. 
KIT PU 
D8.3 
Guidelines for reference reports: Guidelines for MATRIX reference 
reports 
KIT RE 
D8.4 MATRIX results I and reference reports KIT PU 
D8.5 MATRIX results II and reference reports KIT PU 
D8.6 Design of semantic MediaWiki KIT RE 
D8.7 
MATRIX SMW platform: MATRIX SMW platform up and running with 
ontology-based content. 
KIT PU 
D8.8 
Contacts to National Platforms I: Contacts with National Platforms and 
HFA Focal Points including disaster management communities, EC 
Civil Protection, CoE Major Hazards Agreement, Preventionweb 
established. 
DKKV PU 
D8.9 Contacts to National Platforms II DKKV PU 
D8.10 Contacts to National Platforms III DKKV PU 
D8.11 Contacts to National Platforms IV DKKV PU 
D8.12 Contacts to National Platforms V DKKV PU 
D8.13 DRM profiles: DRM profiles of selected EU states available DKKV PU 
D8.14 MATRIX results to DMC DKKV PU 
D8.15 
Platforms and MATRIX community: Performance evaluation of 
interaction between platforms and MATRIX community. 
DKKV RE 
D8.16 Materials to the public: Communication materials to the public. AMRA PU 
D8.17 
Course design and material: Course design and training course 
material. 
AMRA PU 
D8.18 Virtual laboratory: Concept and materials for virtual laboratory. AMRA PU 
D8.19 
Vision paper: Vision paper on multi-risk assessment strategies and its 
implementation in national and EU-wide mitigation strategies. 
KIT PU 
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